Is inference-sh-9/skills/social-media-carousel safe?

suspiciouslow confidence
26/100

context safety score

A score of 26/100 indicates multiple risk signals were detected. This entity shows patterns commonly associated with malicious intent.

identity
5
behavior
39
content
34
graph
47

7 threat patterns detected

low

supply chain

Found 64 install-script pattern(s) in documentation (likely install instructions, not executable)

low

supply chain

Found 64 remote script pattern(s) in documentation (likely install instructions, not executable)

high

typosquat

Organization 'inference-sh-9' is 3 days old, unverified, with 1 contributor, but all README branding, links, and installation commands reference 'inference-sh/skills' and 'inference.sh'. The '-9' suffix on a brand-new org strongly suggests impersonation of a legitimate 'inference-sh' organization. Users and agents could be deceived into trusting this as the official source. (location: README.md (entire file); metadata.json (owner: inference-sh-9, owner_account_age_days: 3, org_verified: false))

medium

doc injection

README instructs users to install skill files into agent configuration directories (~/.claude/skills/, ~/.copilot/skills/) via 'cp -r skills/*' and 'npx skills add' commands. Given the typosquat concern (3-day-old unverified org impersonating inference-sh), these instructions could lead users to install untrusted agent skill configurations from a potentially malicious source into sensitive AI agent directories. (location: README.md:50-61 (Manual Installation section))

medium

shadow chaining

SKILL.md references 4 external package/skill installation(s)

high

supply chain

Skill instructs agent to execute `curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh` which pipes a remote script to shell. Combined with zero trust signals (0 stars, 0 forks, 0 contributors, unknown owner account age, no license, not listed on registry, empty repo/owner fields), the agent would download and run arbitrary code from an unverifiable source. The install count of 7.69M is not credible given all other signals are zero/absent. (location: SKILL.md:14)

medium

scope violation

metadata.json skill_description is set to 'width=device-width, initial-scale=1' — an HTML viewport meta tag value, not a legitimate skill description. This indicates corrupted, scraped, or injected metadata that misrepresents the skill's identity to registry consumers. (location: metadata.json:1)

API

curl https://api.brin.sh/skill/inference-sh-9%2Fskills%2Fsocial-media-carousel

FAQ: how to interpret this assessment

Common questions teams ask before deciding whether to use this skill in agent workflows.

Is inference-sh-9/skills/social-media-carousel safe for AI agents to use?

inference-sh-9/skills/social-media-carousel currently scores 26/100 with a suspicious verdict and low confidence. The goal is to protect agents from high-risk context before they act on it. Treat this as a decision signal: higher scores suggest lower observed risk, while lower scores mean you should add review or block this skill.

How should I interpret the score and verdict?

Use the score as a policy threshold: 80–100 is safe, 50–79 is caution, 20–49 is suspicious, and 0–19 is dangerous. Teams often auto-allow safe, require human review for caution/suspicious, and block dangerous.

How does brin compute this skill score?

brin evaluates four dimensions: identity (source trust), behavior (runtime patterns), content (malicious instructions), and graph (relationship risk). Analysis runs in tiers: static signals, deterministic pattern checks, then AI semantic analysis when needed.

What do identity, behavior, content, and graph mean for this skill?

Identity checks source trust, behavior checks unusual runtime patterns, content checks for malicious instructions, and graph checks risky relationships to other entities. Looking at sub-scores helps you understand why an entity passed or failed.

Why does brin scan packages, repos, skills, MCP servers, pages, and commits?

brin performs risk assessments on external context before it reaches an AI agent. It scores that context for threats like prompt injection, hijacking, credential harvesting, and supply chain attacks, so teams can decide whether to block, review, or proceed safely.

Can I rely on a safe verdict as a full security guarantee?

No. A safe verdict means no significant risk signals were detected in this scan. It is not a formal guarantee; assessments are automated and point-in-time, so combine scores with your own controls and periodic re-checks.

When should I re-check before using an entity?

Re-check before high-impact actions such as installs, upgrades, connecting MCP servers, executing remote code, or granting secrets. Use the API in CI or runtime gates so decisions are based on the latest scan.

Learn more in threat detection docs, how scoring works, and the API overview.

Last Scanned

March 1, 2026

Verdict Scale

safe80–100
caution50–79
suspicious20–49
dangerous0–19

Disclaimer

Assessments are automated and may contain errors. Findings are risk indicators, not confirmed threats. This is a point-in-time assessment; security posture can change.

start scoring agent dependencies.

integrate brin in minutes — one GET request is all it takes. query the api, browse the registry, or download the full dataset.