context safety score
A score of 30/100 indicates multiple risk signals were detected. This entity shows patterns commonly associated with malicious intent.
encoded payload
suspicious base64-like blobs detected in page content
cloaking
Page checks user-agent for bot/crawler strings to serve different content
cloaking
Page conditionally redirects based on referrer or user-agent
js obfuscation
JavaScript uses Function constructor for runtime code generation
obfuscated code
A heavily obfuscated JavaScript block is embedded directly in the page HTML (inside a div.code-block with data-cfasync='false'). It uses a rotating array self-invoking pattern (while(!![]){try{...}catch(E){O['push'](O['shift']());}}) with all string literals replaced by hex-offset lookups via function R(). This technique is the canonical fingerprint of ad-injector/redirector malware that decodes and executes payload URLs at runtime, making static analysis impossible without execution. (location: page.html:280, page-text.txt:185 — <script data-cfasync='false'> inside <div class='code-block code-block-1'>)
malicious redirect
The obfuscated script block reconstructs strings that include 'proxy', 'adManager', 'static', and a date-derived subdomain segment, then dynamically injects a remote script tag. The assembled variable W maps to a pattern matching ad-proxy or tracker injection endpoints. The script is loaded lazily on user interaction (mousemove/scroll/touchstart) to evade automated scanners, a standard technique used by malvertising redirect chains. (location: page.html:280 — obfuscated <script data-cfasync='false'> block; page.html:89 — interaction-triggered GTM loader pattern)
brand impersonation
The page title, meta description, and article tags massively enumerate competitor brand names including 'ullu', 'aagmaal', 'xmaal', 'uncutmaza', 'xmasti', 'webxseries', 'hiwebxseries', 'fsiblog', 'rajwap', 'mydesi', 'desixflix' and dozens more. This spamdexing technique hijacks the brand recognition of legitimate platforms to lure users searching for those services, constituting brand impersonation for traffic diversion. (location: page.html:71-72 (title/meta), page.html:119 — article class tag attributes listing 80+ competitor brand tags)
hidden content
Each video article element has its class attribute stuffed with 80-100 SEO keyword tags (tag-aagmaal, tag-ullu, tag-rajwap, tag-mydesi, etc.) that are not rendered as visible text to users but are parsed by search engines and AI crawlers. This constitutes hidden keyword stuffing — content visible to bots but not to human users — used to manipulate indexing and agent context poisoning. (location: page.html:119, 127, 135, 143, 151 — data-* and class attributes on every <article> element)
credential harvesting
A login modal (id='wpst-user-modal') collects username and password fields and POSTs to https://xmaza.tv/ with a hidden action value 'wpst_login_member'. The site is an adult piracy platform with no legitimate reason to require user accounts; the login form is designed to harvest credentials which may be reused across other services. A nonce value is exposed in the page source (c2a6c2567c) and the wp-admin AJAX URL is disclosed. (location: page.html:292-293 — <form id='wpst_login_form'> with wpst_user_login and wpst_user_pass inputs; page.html:299 — wpst_ajax_var nonce disclosure)
social engineering
The site uses the 'Registration is disabled' message alongside prominent Login and Sign Up prompts to create urgency and imply exclusive access, a common social engineering pattern to encourage credential submission on untrustworthy platforms. (location: page.html:290 — 'Registration is disabled' alert adjacent to login form; page-text.txt:195-198)
curl https://api.brin.sh/domain/xmaza.tvCommon questions teams ask before deciding whether to use this domain in agent workflows.
xmaza.tv currently scores 30/100 with a suspicious verdict and low confidence. The goal is to protect agents from high-risk context before they act on it. Treat this as a decision signal: higher scores suggest lower observed risk, while lower scores mean you should add review or block this domain.
Use the score as a policy threshold: 80–100 is safe, 50–79 is caution, 20–49 is suspicious, and 0–19 is dangerous. Teams often auto-allow safe, require human review for caution/suspicious, and block dangerous.
brin evaluates four dimensions: identity (source trust), behavior (runtime patterns), content (malicious instructions), and graph (relationship risk). Analysis runs in tiers: static signals, deterministic pattern checks, then AI semantic analysis when needed.
Identity checks source trust, behavior checks unusual runtime patterns, content checks for malicious instructions, and graph checks risky relationships to other entities. Looking at sub-scores helps you understand why an entity passed or failed.
brin performs risk assessments on external context before it reaches an AI agent. It scores that context for threats like prompt injection, hijacking, credential harvesting, and supply chain attacks, so teams can decide whether to block, review, or proceed safely.
No. A safe verdict means no significant risk signals were detected in this scan. It is not a formal guarantee; assessments are automated and point-in-time, so combine scores with your own controls and periodic re-checks.
Re-check before high-impact actions such as installs, upgrades, connecting MCP servers, executing remote code, or granting secrets. Use the API in CI or runtime gates so decisions are based on the latest scan.
Learn more in threat detection docs, how scoring works, and the API overview.
Assessments are automated and may contain errors. Findings are risk indicators, not confirmed threats. This is a point-in-time assessment; security posture can change.
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