context safety score
A score of 41/100 indicates multiple risk signals were detected. This entity shows patterns commonly associated with malicious intent.
encoded payload
suspicious base64-like blobs detected in page content
malicious redirect
script/meta redirect patterns detected in page source
cloaking
Page conditionally redirects based on referrer or user-agent
js obfuscation
Obfuscated document.write with encoded content
social engineering
The LinkedIn social button's onclick handler contains an injected inline <script> tag as a string within an HTML attribute: onclick="<script> document.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\", function() { ... window.location.href = \"https://www.linkedin.com/company/vrtcal-markets-inc.\"; ... }); <\/script>". Embedding script tags as onclick attribute values is anomalous and could be used to confuse HTML parsers or security scanners, though modern browsers would not execute it as written. It is an unusual construction that resembles an obfuscation or injection artifact. (location: page.html:409, w-socials linkedin anchor onclick attribute)
obfuscated code
The LinkedIn social link uses a non-standard onclick attribute containing a full inline <script> block as a string value rather than valid JavaScript. This construction (onclick="<script>...<\/script>") is non-functional in browsers but is anomalous and atypical of legitimate CMS output, suggesting possible template injection or accidental persistence of injected content in the CMS database. (location: page.html:409, LinkedIn anchor onclick attribute)
social engineering
The signup flow posts credentials (email, password, firstname, lastname, phone, address fields) via jQuery AJAX to https://ui.vrtcal.com/signup.php, and on success redirects to https://vrtcalstg.wpengine.com/signupsuccess — a staging WPEngine subdomain rather than the production domain. Similarly, the verification flow redirects to https://vrtcalstg.wpengine.com/signin. Redirecting users to a staging/dev subdomain after credential submission is suspicious and may expose submitted credentials to a less-secured environment. (location: page.html:192, 230 — vrtCheckFormAndSubmit() and vrtCheckFormAndSubmit_Verification() success handlers)
credential harvesting
Post-signup credential submission (email, password, full name, phone, full address) is sent via AJAX POST to https://ui.vrtcal.com/signup.php with success redirection to the staging domain https://vrtcalstg.wpengine.com/signupsuccess. The use of a staging WPEngine domain as the post-signup destination for a production site is anomalous and could indicate that newly registered user credentials flow through an insufficiently secured staging environment. (location: page.html:174-199, vrtCheckFormAndSubmit() AJAX call and success redirect)
hidden content
The page sets meta robots to 'noindex, nofollow', preventing search engine indexing of the page. While not inherently malicious, combined with the staging redirects and inline script anomalies, it reduces the discoverability and scrutiny of the page's content. (location: page.html:6, <meta name='robots' content='noindex, nofollow' />)
malicious redirect
After successful signup verification, users are redirected to https://vrtcalstg.wpengine.com/signin — a staging WPEngine subdomain — rather than the production https://www.vrtcal.com/signin. This cross-domain redirect after password submission routes users to a third-party-hosted staging environment, which is outside the primary domain's control and security posture. (location: page.html:230, vrtCheckFormAndSubmit_Verification() success handler window.location redirect)
curl https://api.brin.sh/domain/vrtcal.comCommon questions teams ask before deciding whether to use this domain in agent workflows.
vrtcal.com currently scores 41/100 with a suspicious verdict and low confidence. The goal is to protect agents from high-risk context before they act on it. Treat this as a decision signal: higher scores suggest lower observed risk, while lower scores mean you should add review or block this domain.
Use the score as a policy threshold: 80–100 is safe, 50–79 is caution, 20–49 is suspicious, and 0–19 is dangerous. Teams often auto-allow safe, require human review for caution/suspicious, and block dangerous.
brin evaluates four dimensions: identity (source trust), behavior (runtime patterns), content (malicious instructions), and graph (relationship risk). Analysis runs in tiers: static signals, deterministic pattern checks, then AI semantic analysis when needed.
Identity checks source trust, behavior checks unusual runtime patterns, content checks for malicious instructions, and graph checks risky relationships to other entities. Looking at sub-scores helps you understand why an entity passed or failed.
brin performs risk assessments on external context before it reaches an AI agent. It scores that context for threats like prompt injection, hijacking, credential harvesting, and supply chain attacks, so teams can decide whether to block, review, or proceed safely.
No. A safe verdict means no significant risk signals were detected in this scan. It is not a formal guarantee; assessments are automated and point-in-time, so combine scores with your own controls and periodic re-checks.
Re-check before high-impact actions such as installs, upgrades, connecting MCP servers, executing remote code, or granting secrets. Use the API in CI or runtime gates so decisions are based on the latest scan.
Learn more in threat detection docs, how scoring works, and the API overview.
Assessments are automated and may contain errors. Findings are risk indicators, not confirmed threats. This is a point-in-time assessment; security posture can change.
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