context safety score
A score of 36/100 indicates multiple risk signals were detected. This entity shows patterns commonly associated with malicious intent.
encoded payload
suspicious base64-like blobs detected in page content
cloaking
Page loads content in transparent or zero-size iframe overlay
brand impersonation
The site at nrel.gov presents itself as 'National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR)' — a fictitious entity impersonating NREL (National Renewable Energy Laboratory), a real U.S. Department of Energy national laboratory. The page title reads 'Home | NLR', the logo alt text is 'National Laboratory of the Rockies', and all branding uses 'NLR' instead of 'NREL'. The real NREL is located at nrel.gov, making this a direct domain-level impersonation of a federal government research institution. (location: page.html:2, page.html:236-237, page.html:624, page.html:879)
brand impersonation
The footer claims the site is 'a national laboratory of the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Critical Minerals and Energy Innovation, operated under Contract No. DE-AC36-08GO28308' — falsely attributing a real DOE contract number to a fictitious 'National Laboratory of the Rockies'. Contract DE-AC36-08GO28308 is the actual NREL operating contract, being misappropriated here to lend false legitimacy. (location: page.html:879)
brand impersonation
Social media links in the footer reference real NREL accounts: Instagram links to '@nationalrenewableenergylab', YouTube to '@nationallaboratoryoftherockies', and Threads to '@nationalrenewableenergylab'. This mixes real NREL social handles with fake NLR branding to create a veneer of legitimacy. (location: page.html:834-838)
brand impersonation
The footer contains a link to 'https://developer.nrel.gov/' (Developers) and 'https://thesource.nrel.gov/' (Employees) — real NREL subdomains — embedded within the impersonation site, blurring the boundary between the fake NLR site and the real NREL infrastructure. (location: page.html:857)
brand impersonation
News article links point to 'https://www.nlr.gov/...' while the scanned domain is nrel.gov. The site operates on nrel.gov but references www.nlr.gov as its canonical domain for news articles, indicating the impersonation infrastructure spans at least two domains (nrel.gov and nlr.gov). (location: page.html:697-710)
brand impersonation
Publication document links point to 'https://docs.nlr.gov/docs/...' for technical reports, mimicking the real NREL docs repository at docs.nrel.gov. These links lead to a parallel fake document infrastructure under nlr.gov. (location: page.html:727)
social engineering
The site presents fabricated government research content (geothermal market reports, cybersecurity partnerships, DOE contract attribution) with realistic dates (2026) and professional design to deceive users into trusting it as an authoritative U.S. government energy research source. This is a sophisticated social engineering operation targeting users seeking legitimate NREL resources. (location: page.html:612-614, page.html:727, page.html:879)
phishing
The site hosts a 'Subscribe to NLR' link and a newsletter subscription page (/news/subscribe), as well as a 'Contact Us' form (/webmaster). These could be used to harvest user email addresses and personal information under the false pretense of subscribing to a legitimate U.S. government laboratory newsletter. (location: page.html:831, page.html:492-494)
phishing
The site contains a 'Careers' section with job postings (/careers/find-job) and a hiring process page on a domain impersonating a federal laboratory. Job applicants could be deceived into submitting resumes, personal information, and employment history to this fraudulent entity. (location: page.html:521-560)
malicious redirect
The search form posts to 'https://search4.nlr.gov/texis/search/?pr=metanlr&query={query}' — an external nlr.gov subdomain. Users performing searches on what they believe is nrel.gov are redirected to nlr.gov infrastructure, reinforcing the cross-domain impersonation and potentially exposing search queries to the threat actor. (location: page.html:250)
curl https://api.brin.sh/domain/nrel.govCommon questions teams ask before deciding whether to use this domain in agent workflows.
nrel.gov currently scores 36/100 with a suspicious verdict and low confidence. The goal is to protect agents from high-risk context before they act on it. Treat this as a decision signal: higher scores suggest lower observed risk, while lower scores mean you should add review or block this domain.
Use the score as a policy threshold: 80–100 is safe, 50–79 is caution, 20–49 is suspicious, and 0–19 is dangerous. Teams often auto-allow safe, require human review for caution/suspicious, and block dangerous.
brin evaluates four dimensions: identity (source trust), behavior (runtime patterns), content (malicious instructions), and graph (relationship risk). Analysis runs in tiers: static signals, deterministic pattern checks, then AI semantic analysis when needed.
Identity checks source trust, behavior checks unusual runtime patterns, content checks for malicious instructions, and graph checks risky relationships to other entities. Looking at sub-scores helps you understand why an entity passed or failed.
brin performs risk assessments on external context before it reaches an AI agent. It scores that context for threats like prompt injection, hijacking, credential harvesting, and supply chain attacks, so teams can decide whether to block, review, or proceed safely.
No. A safe verdict means no significant risk signals were detected in this scan. It is not a formal guarantee; assessments are automated and point-in-time, so combine scores with your own controls and periodic re-checks.
Re-check before high-impact actions such as installs, upgrades, connecting MCP servers, executing remote code, or granting secrets. Use the API in CI or runtime gates so decisions are based on the latest scan.
Learn more in threat detection docs, how scoring works, and the API overview.
Assessments are automated and may contain errors. Findings are risk indicators, not confirmed threats. This is a point-in-time assessment; security posture can change.
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