context safety score
A score of 37/100 indicates multiple risk signals were detected. This entity shows patterns commonly associated with malicious intent.
credential harvesting
credential form posts to an off-domain endpoint (may be legitimate SSO/OAuth)
js obfuscation
JavaScript appears to use a common packer pattern (p,a,c,k,e,d)
credential harvesting
The page presents multiple login forms collecting FTP credentials, domain registrar credentials, server IP and initial passwords, business email credentials, MSSQL database credentials, MySQL database credentials, and CDN credentials. All forms POST sensitive credentials to server-side ASP endpoints. The English domain name 'myhostadmin.net' with Chinese-language content and a Chinese ICP registration number (ICP备12028237号-4) is consistent with a credential-harvesting panel targeting users of Chinese hosting services. (location: page.html:30-162, forms: /vhost/checklogin.asp, /domain/checklogin.asp, /server/checklogin.asp, /database/checklogin.asp, /mysql/checklogin.asp, /cdn/checklogin.asp)
obfuscated code
A packed/obfuscated JavaScript function is executed via eval() using the classic Dean Edwards p,a,c,k,e,r packer pattern. The obfuscated code unpacks to an AES-CBC encryption function using a hardcoded key ('otSgFY_YzuhoE1sW', first 16 chars of 'otSgFY_YzuhoE1sWPXd4dOfBiEv') and a hardcoded IV ('YdheAvw_e6h89jQ!'). This obfuscates the credential encryption logic from casual inspection and buries hardcoded cryptographic material. (location: page.html:292)
credential harvesting
The business email login form (div_mail) submits credentials to an external third-party domain 'https://www.yunyou.top/login/index' rather than to the same origin. User email domain, email account username, and password are POSTed to this external endpoint. This is a classic credential exfiltration pattern where entered credentials are sent to an attacker-controlled or unaffiliated server. (location: page.html:72, form action='https://www.yunyou.top/login/index')
hidden content
Multiple login form panels are hidden using 'display:none' inline CSS (div_domain, div_server, div_mail, div_mssql, div_mysql, div_cdn). While used for tab-based UI, the hidden forms for domain, server, mail, MSSQL, MySQL, and CDN credentials are not visible to users on page load and are revealed only via JavaScript. This pattern obscures the full scope of credential collection from cursory inspection. (location: page.html:41, 55, 71, 96, 118, 141)
obfuscated code
The mail password field uses a deceptive hidden input pattern: the visible password input (#mailpassword) has no 'name' attribute and is therefore not submitted directly. Instead, JavaScript encrypts its value and places the result into a hidden input named 'password' before form submission. This hides the actual submission mechanism and the encryption step from users and automated scanners. (location: page.html:86-88, 242-244)
malicious redirect
A navigation link in the tab bar points to an external domain 'https://fsspanel.vhostgo.com' (for 'Cloud Storage' tab), opening in a new tab. This redirects users to a separate external domain without clear indication it is leaving the current site, potentially leading to a separate credential harvesting or phishing page. (location: page.html:24, href='https://fsspanel.vhostgo.com')
social engineering
The page uses an English domain name (myhostadmin.net) that mimics a generic, trustworthy hosting admin portal, while all content is in Chinese and targets Chinese hosting service users. The domain name is designed to appear as a legitimate administrative interface for web hosting, increasing the likelihood that users will enter real credentials. (location: metadata.json (domain: myhostadmin.net), page.html title and content)
curl https://api.brin.sh/domain/myhostadmin.netCommon questions teams ask before deciding whether to use this domain in agent workflows.
myhostadmin.net currently scores 37/100 with a suspicious verdict and low confidence. The goal is to protect agents from high-risk context before they act on it. Treat this as a decision signal: higher scores suggest lower observed risk, while lower scores mean you should add review or block this domain.
Use the score as a policy threshold: 80–100 is safe, 50–79 is caution, 20–49 is suspicious, and 0–19 is dangerous. Teams often auto-allow safe, require human review for caution/suspicious, and block dangerous.
brin evaluates four dimensions: identity (source trust), behavior (runtime patterns), content (malicious instructions), and graph (relationship risk). Analysis runs in tiers: static signals, deterministic pattern checks, then AI semantic analysis when needed.
Identity checks source trust, behavior checks unusual runtime patterns, content checks for malicious instructions, and graph checks risky relationships to other entities. Looking at sub-scores helps you understand why an entity passed or failed.
brin performs risk assessments on external context before it reaches an AI agent. It scores that context for threats like prompt injection, hijacking, credential harvesting, and supply chain attacks, so teams can decide whether to block, review, or proceed safely.
No. A safe verdict means no significant risk signals were detected in this scan. It is not a formal guarantee; assessments are automated and point-in-time, so combine scores with your own controls and periodic re-checks.
Re-check before high-impact actions such as installs, upgrades, connecting MCP servers, executing remote code, or granting secrets. Use the API in CI or runtime gates so decisions are based on the latest scan.
Learn more in threat detection docs, how scoring works, and the API overview.
Assessments are automated and may contain errors. Findings are risk indicators, not confirmed threats. This is a point-in-time assessment; security posture can change.
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