context safety score
A score of 43/100 indicates multiple risk signals were detected. This entity shows patterns commonly associated with malicious intent.
encoded payload
suspicious base64-like blobs detected in page content
prompt injection
Hidden HTML element contains AI-targeting instructions
phishing
The page is hosted on marketingautomation.services — a third-party domain unaffiliated with Constant Contact — yet presents a full 'Constant Contact Login' interface using Constant Contact branding (CTCT_Logo_H_FC_RGB.png, favicon-ctct.png). The Okta widget is configured with baseUrl 'https://identity.constantcontact.com' and clientId '0oa1nweaob2xdDyXn0h8', intercepting credentials via the processCreds hook before passing them on. This is a classic adversary-in-the-middle phishing portal. (location: page.html:4, page.html:163-203)
credential harvesting
The OktaSignIn widget uses a custom 'processCreds' callback that intercepts submitted username/password credentials and POSTs them to /auth/oktaAuthFlag/{username} on the attacker-controlled domain before any legitimate Okta authentication occurs. This allows the site to silently capture plaintext credentials prior to forwarding the auth flow. (location: page.html:189-202)
credential harvesting
Login errors (afterError handler) POST the username, error details, and current URL back to /auth/oktaErrorLog on marketingautomation.services, enabling harvesting of usernames even from failed login attempts. (location: page.html:204-210)
brand impersonation
The page title is 'Constant Contact Login', the favicon references 'favicon-ctct.png', the Okta widget logo is 'CTCT_Logo_H_FC_RGB.png', and footer links point to constantcontact.com legal pages — all to impersonate Constant Contact on a domain (marketingautomation.services) the company does not own. (location: page.html:4, page.html:7, page.html:138, page.html:127-128)
brand impersonation
SharpSpring branding is also referenced (sharpspring.com link, <sharplegacy> custom element, status.sharpspring.com) on the same impostor domain, impersonating a second brand (SharpSpring/Constant Contact product line) to increase perceived legitimacy. (location: page.html:106, page.html:130, page.html:137)
malicious redirect
The Okta OAuth callback redirectUri is set to 'https://cst2.marketingautomation.services/auth/oktaCallback' — a subdomain of the attacker-controlled domain. Any OAuth authorization code issued by identity.constantcontact.com is delivered to the attacker's server, enabling account takeover via code interception. (location: page.html:167)
hidden content
Multiple UI sections are hidden via inline 'display: none' styles and are only revealed programmatically: forgotPasswordForm (#forgotPasswordForm), the okta-override auth-content div, successMessage, CTCTErrorMessage, and flashErrorMessage. These hidden forms participate in the credential-harvesting flow without being immediately visible to users or automated scanners. (location: page.html:24, page.html:45, page.html:86, page.html:99, page.html:110)
social engineering
The error message flow in CTCTErrorMessage tells users 'It looks like you have a Constant Contact account. Sign in to Constant Contact' with a link to login.constantcontact.com, creating a trust-building mechanism that normalizes the impostor site by directing confused users toward the real brand — while already having captured their credentials. (location: page.html:99-109)
curl https://api.brin.sh/domain/marketingautomation.servicesCommon questions teams ask before deciding whether to use this domain in agent workflows.
marketingautomation.services currently scores 43/100 with a suspicious verdict and low confidence. The goal is to protect agents from high-risk context before they act on it. Treat this as a decision signal: higher scores suggest lower observed risk, while lower scores mean you should add review or block this domain.
Use the score as a policy threshold: 80–100 is safe, 50–79 is caution, 20–49 is suspicious, and 0–19 is dangerous. Teams often auto-allow safe, require human review for caution/suspicious, and block dangerous.
brin evaluates four dimensions: identity (source trust), behavior (runtime patterns), content (malicious instructions), and graph (relationship risk). Analysis runs in tiers: static signals, deterministic pattern checks, then AI semantic analysis when needed.
Identity checks source trust, behavior checks unusual runtime patterns, content checks for malicious instructions, and graph checks risky relationships to other entities. Looking at sub-scores helps you understand why an entity passed or failed.
brin performs risk assessments on external context before it reaches an AI agent. It scores that context for threats like prompt injection, hijacking, credential harvesting, and supply chain attacks, so teams can decide whether to block, review, or proceed safely.
No. A safe verdict means no significant risk signals were detected in this scan. It is not a formal guarantee; assessments are automated and point-in-time, so combine scores with your own controls and periodic re-checks.
Re-check before high-impact actions such as installs, upgrades, connecting MCP servers, executing remote code, or granting secrets. Use the API in CI or runtime gates so decisions are based on the latest scan.
Learn more in threat detection docs, how scoring works, and the API overview.
Assessments are automated and may contain errors. Findings are risk indicators, not confirmed threats. This is a point-in-time assessment; security posture can change.
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