context safety score
A score of 43/100 indicates multiple risk signals were detected. This entity shows patterns commonly associated with malicious intent.
encoded payload
suspicious base64-like blobs detected in page content
cloaking
Page conditionally redirects based on referrer or user-agent
malicious redirect
The zmr_listen function intercepts all click events on content items (thumbs__item, tag, more_videos_item_holder), suppresses the original event with preventDefault/stopPropagation/stopImmediatePropagation, then programmatically opens a new tab to the intended URL while simultaneously firing a hidden secondary request to /xxmr/?or=<zone_id>&dd=<tracking_token> in a delayed click (100ms). This is a click-hijacking redirect mechanism that silently loads a second destination on every user click. (location: page.html:2827-2830, page-text.txt:724-727 (zmr_listen function))
malicious redirect
The crDynSh function dynamically injects a popunder script from https://a.pemsrv.com/popunder1000.js — a known popunder ad network — into the page body on first user interaction. This is a drive-by popunder attack: a hidden browser window or tab is opened to a third-party destination without user consent. (location: page.html:2896-2901, page-text.txt:793-797 (crDynSh function))
hidden content
The zmr click-interception system fires a hidden secondary navigation to /xxmr/?or=<zone_id>&dd=<fingerprint_token> on every qualifying click, without any visible indication to the user. The endpoint path /xxmr/ is obfuscated and the request is triggered silently via a dynamically created anchor element clicked via JavaScript, making it invisible to the user. (location: page.html:2829-2830, page-text.txt:726-727 (zigusnnauua variable and ddlk2.click()))
hidden content
CSS class .cb_nm has display:none applied by default, hiding a substantial number of category/tag links from view. These hidden links are only revealed upon user interaction with 'Show More' buttons. While functionally benign for a tube site, the pattern of bulk hidden links can be used for SEO manipulation or to hide unwanted content from casual inspection. (location: page.html:1806 (.cb_nm{display:none}), page.html:2395-2398 (categories-list with cb_nm spans))
hidden content
A large base64-encoded PNG image is embedded inline within a CSS rule for .dark .dropdown-menu background. The encoded data is several kilobytes long and its full contents cannot be verified without decoding. Embedding arbitrary binary data in CSS is an uncommon technique that can be used to smuggle payloads or fingerprinting data. (location: page.html:1673 (.dark .dropdown-menu CSS rule with data:image/png;base64 payload))
social engineering
The site intercepts mousedown/mouseup events globally (cl_intercept_block and cl_intercept_run) to override normal click behavior across the entire page. This covert event interception prevents users from middle-clicking or right-clicking to inspect destinations, and manipulates the click flow to insert ad redirects, constituting deceptive interaction design. (location: page.html:2637-2671, page-text.txt:534-567 (cl_intercept_block/cl_intercept_run functions))
social engineering
The interstitial ad system (my_inter_begin, my_inter_listen) intercepts clicks on legitimate content items and conditionally overlays full-page interstitial ads, blocking user navigation. A 'Close Ad' button is injected dynamically rather than being present in the original markup, obscuring the mechanism from static analysis and creating a deceptive UX that traps users before navigating to their intended destination. (location: page.html:2566-2830 (my_inter_begin, my_inter_listen, mine_fp_inter_close_create functions))
curl https://api.brin.sh/domain/gosexpod.comCommon questions teams ask before deciding whether to use this domain in agent workflows.
gosexpod.com currently scores 43/100 with a suspicious verdict and low confidence. The goal is to protect agents from high-risk context before they act on it. Treat this as a decision signal: higher scores suggest lower observed risk, while lower scores mean you should add review or block this domain.
Use the score as a policy threshold: 80–100 is safe, 50–79 is caution, 20–49 is suspicious, and 0–19 is dangerous. Teams often auto-allow safe, require human review for caution/suspicious, and block dangerous.
brin evaluates four dimensions: identity (source trust), behavior (runtime patterns), content (malicious instructions), and graph (relationship risk). Analysis runs in tiers: static signals, deterministic pattern checks, then AI semantic analysis when needed.
Identity checks source trust, behavior checks unusual runtime patterns, content checks for malicious instructions, and graph checks risky relationships to other entities. Looking at sub-scores helps you understand why an entity passed or failed.
brin performs risk assessments on external context before it reaches an AI agent. It scores that context for threats like prompt injection, hijacking, credential harvesting, and supply chain attacks, so teams can decide whether to block, review, or proceed safely.
No. A safe verdict means no significant risk signals were detected in this scan. It is not a formal guarantee; assessments are automated and point-in-time, so combine scores with your own controls and periodic re-checks.
Re-check before high-impact actions such as installs, upgrades, connecting MCP servers, executing remote code, or granting secrets. Use the API in CI or runtime gates so decisions are based on the latest scan.
Learn more in threat detection docs, how scoring works, and the API overview.
Assessments are automated and may contain errors. Findings are risk indicators, not confirmed threats. This is a point-in-time assessment; security posture can change.
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