context safety score
A score of 33/100 indicates multiple risk signals were detected. This entity shows patterns commonly associated with malicious intent.
encoded payload
suspicious base64-like blobs detected in page content
cloaking
Page conditionally redirects based on referrer or user-agent
credential harvesting
The page contains JavaScript that reads sensitive credentials (token, account, password, loginType) from IndexedDB and transmits them via postMessage to a parent window with wildcard origin ('*'). This allows any cross-origin parent frame to receive stored credentials. The initAccount() function explicitly extracts password and account data and sends it to window.parent without origin validation. (location: page.html:74-100)
social engineering
The site promotes a gambling platform (JiLiKK.VIP) with deceptive incentive language: 'get a free random sign up bonus and withdraw it after one round of betting.' This is a classic social engineering lure used to drive user registration and deposit on potentially unlicensed gambling sites. (location: page.html:1-2, meta description and og:description tags)
brand impersonation
The domain c3om5csi.com (91 days old, random-looking name) presents itself as 'JILIKK.VIP' — a brand name distinct from the actual domain. The site impersonates or proxies a gambling brand under an unrelated, disposable-looking domain, a common technique to evade blocklists while the primary brand domain is flagged. (location: page.html:6-9, og:site_name and og:url)
credential harvesting
The postMessage handler at the parent level stores received token, account, password, and loginType values directly into IndexedDB without any origin verification (event.data checked with no sender origin validation). Any iframe loaded on the page can inject arbitrary credentials into storage by sending a 'fixToken' message. (location: page.html:85-94)
hidden content
window.__APP_CONFIG__.domainInfo contains a heavily obfuscated/encoded string (base64-like encoded blob) injected into the page config. This encoded payload is thousands of characters long and its decoded content is not visible to the user or standard scanners, hiding configuration or instructions from analysis. (location: page.html:18, window.__APP_CONFIG__ script block)
obfuscated code
The domainInfo field in window.__APP_CONFIG__ contains a very long encoded string (appears to be multi-layer base64 or custom encoding starting with '=Q0NlQ0Nl...'). Obfuscated configuration of this length is anomalous and typically used to hide C2 URLs, redirect targets, or anti-analysis logic from static scanners. (location: page.html:18, window.__APP_CONFIG__.domainInfo value)
malicious redirect
The page includes the Telegram Web App SDK (telegram.org/js/telegram-web-app.js), enabling the gambling site to operate within Telegram mini-app contexts. Combined with the iframe postMessage credential-passing logic and the obfuscated domain config, this suggests infrastructure for redirecting Telegram users into the gambling platform and harvesting their session tokens. (location: page.html:115, script src=telegram.org/js/telegram-web-app.js)
social engineering
The domain is only 91 days old with an unbranded, algorithmically-generated name (c3om5csi.com), yet presents a polished gambling brand identity. This pattern — disposable domain + established brand presentation — is used to cycle through domains as they are blocked, continuously re-engaging users under a fresh URL while maintaining the illusion of a legitimate service. (location: metadata.json:domain_age_days=91, page.html og:site_name=JILIKK.VIP)
curl https://api.brin.sh/domain/c3om5csi.comCommon questions teams ask before deciding whether to use this domain in agent workflows.
c3om5csi.com currently scores 33/100 with a suspicious verdict and low confidence. The goal is to protect agents from high-risk context before they act on it. Treat this as a decision signal: higher scores suggest lower observed risk, while lower scores mean you should add review or block this domain.
Use the score as a policy threshold: 80–100 is safe, 50–79 is caution, 20–49 is suspicious, and 0–19 is dangerous. Teams often auto-allow safe, require human review for caution/suspicious, and block dangerous.
brin evaluates four dimensions: identity (source trust), behavior (runtime patterns), content (malicious instructions), and graph (relationship risk). Analysis runs in tiers: static signals, deterministic pattern checks, then AI semantic analysis when needed.
Identity checks source trust, behavior checks unusual runtime patterns, content checks for malicious instructions, and graph checks risky relationships to other entities. Looking at sub-scores helps you understand why an entity passed or failed.
brin performs risk assessments on external context before it reaches an AI agent. It scores that context for threats like prompt injection, hijacking, credential harvesting, and supply chain attacks, so teams can decide whether to block, review, or proceed safely.
No. A safe verdict means no significant risk signals were detected in this scan. It is not a formal guarantee; assessments are automated and point-in-time, so combine scores with your own controls and periodic re-checks.
Re-check before high-impact actions such as installs, upgrades, connecting MCP servers, executing remote code, or granting secrets. Use the API in CI or runtime gates so decisions are based on the latest scan.
Learn more in threat detection docs, how scoring works, and the API overview.
Assessments are automated and may contain errors. Findings are risk indicators, not confirmed threats. This is a point-in-time assessment; security posture can change.
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