context safety score
A score of 33/100 indicates multiple risk signals were detected. This entity shows patterns commonly associated with malicious intent.
encoded payload
suspicious base64-like blobs detected in page content
malicious redirect
script/meta redirect patterns detected in page source
cloaking
Page checks user-agent for bot/crawler strings to serve different content
cloaking
Page conditionally redirects based on referrer or user-agent
js obfuscation
JavaScript uses Function constructor for runtime code generation
malicious redirect
JavaScript manipulates browser history by pushing 10 states via history.pushState() then hijacks the back button via onpopstate to force a redirect to https://backbutton.videobaba.xyz/back-button-script/public/getit.php?site=BSS. This traps users on the site and forces navigation to a third-party destination when the back button is pressed. (location: page.html:65 and page.html:1557-1568)
malicious redirect
Navigation menu contains a link labeled 'Indian Live Sex' and 'Live Girls' pointing to https://blazingserver.net/revive/www/admin/plugins/redirectAd/redirect.php?zoneid=197 and zoneid=362 — opaque ad-network redirect URLs that pass through a third-party ad server before reaching an unknown destination, concealing the final landing page from users and security tools. (location: page.html:243-244)
hidden content
The hero section (page.html:1503) contains a large injected block of Slack UI HTML markup (div.p-workspace__primary_view_body, c-virtual_list, c-message_list, etc.) embedded inside the visible page text. This Slack-interface HTML is invisible to normal users but visible to scrapers and AI agents reading page text, constituting hidden content injection likely intended to manipulate AI/crawler analysis or stage social-engineering content. (location: page.html:1503, page-text.txt:1176)
prompt injection
The hero section embeds a full Slack-style conversation UI DOM structure inside the page body (data-qa attributes: message_container, block-kit-renderer, virtual-list-item, etc.). This is a known prompt injection pattern targeting AI agents that parse page content: injecting fake UI context (a Slack direct message thread) to manipulate agent behavior or data extraction. The content is truncated in the captured HTML but the structural scaffolding of a fabricated Slack DM conversation is present. (location: page.html:1503)
hidden content
Third-party analytics script loaded from https://stats.indianpornempire.com/js/script.js via a defer tag with data-domain attribute. This exfiltrates browsing behavior to an external domain (indianpornempire.com) not disclosed in the site's privacy policy context visible on the page. (location: page.html:63)
hidden content
The <meta http-equiv='delegate-ch'> header delegates multiple client-hint headers (sec-ch-ua, sec-ch-ua-bitness, sec-ch-ua-arch, sec-ch-ua-model, sec-ch-ua-platform, sec-ch-ua-platform-version, sec-ch-ua-full-version, sec-ch-ua-full-version-list, sec-ch-ua-mobile) to https://tsyndicate.com, silently sharing detailed browser/device fingerprinting data with a third-party ad syndication network without user awareness. (location: page.html:67)
social engineering
Ad unit disguised as a content thumbnail is embedded in the video grid with fake view count (6548 views) and fake rating (96%) to make it appear as legitimate user-generated content, directing users to https://www.kamareels2.com. The ad is labeled 'AD' only in small metadata text while visually matching organic video blocks. (location: page.html:474-490)
obfuscated code
The page contains inline JavaScript functions b2a() and a2b() implementing custom Base64 encode/decode routines alongside b64e and b64d wrappers. These are used by the ad insertion framework (ai_insert_code, ai_check_and_insert_block) to store and execute ad payload code via atob/btoa at runtime, obfuscating the actual ad content delivered dynamically from encoded data attributes. (location: page.html:1651-1653, page-text.txt:1324-1326)
curl https://api.brin.sh/domain/bhojpurisex.siteCommon questions teams ask before deciding whether to use this domain in agent workflows.
bhojpurisex.site currently scores 33/100 with a suspicious verdict and low confidence. The goal is to protect agents from high-risk context before they act on it. Treat this as a decision signal: higher scores suggest lower observed risk, while lower scores mean you should add review or block this domain.
Use the score as a policy threshold: 80–100 is safe, 50–79 is caution, 20–49 is suspicious, and 0–19 is dangerous. Teams often auto-allow safe, require human review for caution/suspicious, and block dangerous.
brin evaluates four dimensions: identity (source trust), behavior (runtime patterns), content (malicious instructions), and graph (relationship risk). Analysis runs in tiers: static signals, deterministic pattern checks, then AI semantic analysis when needed.
Identity checks source trust, behavior checks unusual runtime patterns, content checks for malicious instructions, and graph checks risky relationships to other entities. Looking at sub-scores helps you understand why an entity passed or failed.
brin performs risk assessments on external context before it reaches an AI agent. It scores that context for threats like prompt injection, hijacking, credential harvesting, and supply chain attacks, so teams can decide whether to block, review, or proceed safely.
No. A safe verdict means no significant risk signals were detected in this scan. It is not a formal guarantee; assessments are automated and point-in-time, so combine scores with your own controls and periodic re-checks.
Re-check before high-impact actions such as installs, upgrades, connecting MCP servers, executing remote code, or granting secrets. Use the API in CI or runtime gates so decisions are based on the latest scan.
Learn more in threat detection docs, how scoring works, and the API overview.
Assessments are automated and may contain errors. Findings are risk indicators, not confirmed threats. This is a point-in-time assessment; security posture can change.
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