context safety score
A score of 43/100 indicates multiple risk signals were detected. This entity shows patterns commonly associated with malicious intent.
encoded payload
suspicious base64-like blobs detected in page content
cloaking
Page conditionally redirects based on referrer or user-agent
brand impersonation
The page is served from domain 5s5z.com but all metadata (og:site_name, og:title, og:url, twitter:title) reference 'JiLi56.com', indicating the hosting domain is masquerading as or proxying a different brand. Users and crawlers are presented with a different identity than the actual domain. (location: page.html:8-11, og:site_name, og:title, og:url meta tags)
credential harvesting
JavaScript reads 'token', 'account', 'password', and 'loginType' from IndexedDB (_ionicstorage/_ionickv) and exfiltrates them via postMessage to a parent window with wildcard origin ('*'). This cross-origin credential theft can capture credentials from any parent frame embedding this page, with no origin validation on the receiving end either. (location: page.html:77-98, initAccount() and postMessage handler)
credential harvesting
The page listens for 'fixToken' postMessages from any origin (event source not validated) and writes received token, account, password, and loginType values directly into IndexedDB. Combined with the outbound postMessage, this creates a bidirectional credential relay with no origin checks. (location: page.html:88-96, window.addEventListener('message') handler)
obfuscated code
window.__APP_CONFIG__.domainInfo contains a very long Base64/custom-encoded string (starting with '==AR3UCR3U...') embedded inline in the page. This obfuscated payload is loaded at runtime and its decoded content is unknown; it may contain configuration for malicious redirects, C2 endpoints, or additional payload delivery instructions. (location: page.html:21, window.__APP_CONFIG__ domainInfo value)
malicious redirect
The isInIframe() function checks URL parameters 'unTopWindow=true' and 'domainType != google' to determine iframe context and conditionally alter behavior (credential exfiltration path). This parameter-driven branching suggests the site is designed to behave differently when embedded in controlled attacker-owned frames vs. direct browsing, a common cloaking and redirect-chaining technique. (location: page.html:24-27, isInIframe() function)
social engineering
Meta descriptions across og: and twitter: tags use high-pressure gambling lure language ('hottest games in town', 'be the next lucky millionaire') with emoji to entice users to engage with the gambling platform, constituting social engineering through false urgency and financial reward promises. (location: page.html:1-15, meta description, og:description, twitter:description)
hidden content
The page title is empty (<title></title>) and the visible page-text.txt contains only legacy polyfill boilerplate with no real content. All actual application content is loaded dynamically via JavaScript bundles (index-R0fdLqud.js, index-legacy-D5vJ-Kei.js), making the true page content invisible to static scanners and potentially hiding malicious UI or additional credential harvesting forms. (location: page.html:118 <title> tag; page-text.txt line 1)
prompt injection
The obfuscated domainInfo blob and dynamic JS bundle loading pattern could be used to inject instructions into AI-based content analysis pipelines that attempt to decode or execute the payload, or to hide instructions within the encoded string that direct AI agents to classify the site as benign. (location: page.html:21, window.__APP_CONFIG__ domainInfo encoded blob)
curl https://api.brin.sh/domain/5s5z.comCommon questions teams ask before deciding whether to use this domain in agent workflows.
5s5z.com currently scores 43/100 with a suspicious verdict and low confidence. The goal is to protect agents from high-risk context before they act on it. Treat this as a decision signal: higher scores suggest lower observed risk, while lower scores mean you should add review or block this domain.
Use the score as a policy threshold: 80–100 is safe, 50–79 is caution, 20–49 is suspicious, and 0–19 is dangerous. Teams often auto-allow safe, require human review for caution/suspicious, and block dangerous.
brin evaluates four dimensions: identity (source trust), behavior (runtime patterns), content (malicious instructions), and graph (relationship risk). Analysis runs in tiers: static signals, deterministic pattern checks, then AI semantic analysis when needed.
Identity checks source trust, behavior checks unusual runtime patterns, content checks for malicious instructions, and graph checks risky relationships to other entities. Looking at sub-scores helps you understand why an entity passed or failed.
brin performs risk assessments on external context before it reaches an AI agent. It scores that context for threats like prompt injection, hijacking, credential harvesting, and supply chain attacks, so teams can decide whether to block, review, or proceed safely.
No. A safe verdict means no significant risk signals were detected in this scan. It is not a formal guarantee; assessments are automated and point-in-time, so combine scores with your own controls and periodic re-checks.
Re-check before high-impact actions such as installs, upgrades, connecting MCP servers, executing remote code, or granting secrets. Use the API in CI or runtime gates so decisions are based on the latest scan.
Learn more in threat detection docs, how scoring works, and the API overview.
Assessments are automated and may contain errors. Findings are risk indicators, not confirmed threats. This is a point-in-time assessment; security posture can change.
integrate brin in minutes — one GET request is all it takes. query the api, browse the registry, or download the full dataset.